4 as a result of the theoretical turn to political matter. Rather, it remains the primary way of thinking politically and of doing politics. This means that a parliament of things can all too easily revert to one of human interest/s. The capacity to revert establishes that to make the theoretical case for political matter is not the same thing as to hold it together politically. Second, even within STS, stuff is largely stabilised. Whilst capacities to overflow are recognised, the primary interest in the field has been in the enrolment of non-humans, as allies or adjuncts. Vitality in these accounts is largely channelled to particular, almost invariably technical and human-centred purposes. Matter is acknowledged but not emergent, lively and open -as vital materialism insists. Combine that sense of a vitality stilled with politics as practiced, in which the closing down of controversy -or what Barry (2002) refers to as the shift from 'hot' to 'cold' politics -is critical, and we see the problem that confronts furthering ontopolitics. Keeping matter alive not only means keeping political controversies open to the vitality of stuff. It suggests that to establish the new demos requires engaging in the always unfinished task of keeping political settlements open to stuff.
The case used to develop these arguments is a familiar one in debates over science-technical controversies. It comprises radioactive waste, specifically the UK's store of HLW and ILW (henceforth HAW) 1 and its projected future in a deep geological disposal facility (DGF). 2 I establish first that this matter of concern has unravelled through the turn to deliberative democracy. As a result, the 1 'Higher activity' radioactive waste is the designation given to high level (HLW) and intermediate level (ILW) radioactive wastes. The UK's Baseline Inventory of radioactive wastes comprises 1400m 3 of high level waste (0.3% by volume) responsible for 36,000,000 terabequerels of radioactivity (41.3% of the radioactivity of the inventory), with intermediate level waste comprising 364,000m 3 (76.3% by volume) and 2,200,000 terabequerels of radioactivity (2.5% of the inventory) -NDA, 2010a,c. The majority of the inventory of HAW is currently stored at Sellafield in West Cumbria. 2 Geological disposal is a means of containing and isolating radioactive materials from the biosphere until such time as their radioactivity has decayed to safe levels. Cesium 137 and strontium
90
, which dominate radioactivity to begin with, decay to safe levels in 300 -1000 years, but some fission product decay chains (e.g. plutonium 239 , plutonium 240 , iodine 129 , technetium 99 and americum
243
) remain dangerous for geological time. A suitable rock formation is therefore seen as a key component in a multi-barrier containment system, which also comprises immobilised waste forms (in which radioactive materials are held in glass, ceramic or cement) and engineered containment systems, typically of stainless steel, copper and bentonite. Deep geological disposal is being actively implemented in Finland and Sweden (Elam & Sundqvist, 2009 and is the preferred means of managing radioactive wastes in the US, the UK and France (Barthe, 2009; Berkhout, 1991; Macfarlane, 2003 Macfarlane, , 2006b Bloomfield & Vurdubakis, 2005; Macfarlane & Ewing, 2006; Chilvers & Burgess, 2008) . 5 current conjuncture is one in which radioactive waste is positioned once more as the preserve of expert technical knowledge, leaving publics to coalesce around the politics of the siting of a future UK DGF. In more general terms, the details of the case demonstrate that onto-politics has unravelled to become human-centred politics. They exemplify the broader point that, in the course of political settlements, a politics of stuff can all too easily be nullified and reconstituted as human-centred. This state of affairs with respect to HAW needs to be made explicit and contested. The latter comprises the second aim of the paper. I turn initially to the undone science tradition of STS to do so. Yet, this only gets us so far. Whilst turning to undone science can anticipate a future in which HAW in a DGF becomes lost or abandoned, in this instance it can offer nothing to counter a future that accords with the Frankenstein myth. The third, and more speculative, intent of the paper therefore is to suggest a different future for HAW within a DGF; one that starts from onto-politics and particularly from the question of how to keep radioactive waste open, affective and eventful in its disposal. In part, vital materialism can answer that question; by thinking radioactivity as thing power. To effect that disposal, however, is argued to require a turn to material culture -to figure a DGF as a means to HAW's burial, and through absent presence; to forge attachments to it; and to constitute and assemble publics. In such a way, I argue, both HAW and a DGF might be returned to a parliament of things.
The paper proceeds through three sections. The initial manoeuvre (Section 2.1) charts the course of debate and policy formation around UK HAW. Having outlined the current political settlement, Section 2.2 establishes its retreat from onto-politics. Whilst it is recognised in the academic literature that the turn to deliberative democracy within UK radioactive waste management worked to shore-up policy outcomes through framing effects (Chilvers & Burgess, 2008; Bickerstaff et al. 2008; Chilvers, 2008) , less remarked upon has been how HAW figured in deliberations. As I show, although fundamentally a matter of onto-politics, HAW was made present in ways that ordered, disciplined and tamed, rather than emphasising its unruliness and liveliness. An effect is that ontopolitics became increasingly human-centric politics. That politics is currently focused on the 6 principles of volunteerism and partnership, and their articulation in staged decision-taking, and it is presently being enacted largely in one part of the UK: West Cumbria (Bickerstaff, forthcoming) . The question this raises, however, is 'What happens to HAW when the politics gets hived off from the physical stuff?' As I show (Section 2.3), HAW has been reclaimed as the preserve of techno-science.
In Section 3 I begin to contest this state of affairs, by casting HAW's intended future in a DGF as an instance of undone science. Of particular interest here is work which highlights how knowledge of hazardous wastes gets lost over time (Frickel, 2008) . I draw on this to anticipate the abandonment of HAW and a future DGF. Yet, whilst undone science can get us this far, drawing on the arguments of Gabrielle Hecht (2006) , I argue that HAW's 'nuclearity' makes it a difficult object to pursue through the civic or community science projects advocated within the undone science tradition. Moreover, I
argue that it is difficult to see how such work might address the issue of abandonment prior to the construction and eventual closure of a DGF.
Section 4 takes up the challenge of how to arrest a future in which HAW and a DGF might be abandoned. This starts by thinking HAW through Jane Bennett's vital materialist project, that is, as thing power, and by examining how HAW might be returned to the demos, through opening up channels of communication between HAW and human publics. I establish two foundational questions for a future DGF. These are: 'How might a DFG that is currently cast as a means to HAW's safe disposal be more open to HAW as thing power?' and 'How might a DGF admit channels of communication between HAW and publics (holding them together), whilst recognising the need to hold them apart?' To answer those questions I argue that it is critical to stop thinking about a DGF simply technically, as a means to disposing (safely) of HAW. Rather, a DGF can be thought of as a means to HAW's burial, that is, as a vault or tomb for radioactive waste. I argue that a DGF be materialised in ways that ensure that it is undisturbed yet continues to assemble publics -that is, that it fulfils the conditions of holding together whilst holding apart. In such a way I establish that to effect HAW's burial requires a turn to material culture. The turn to material culture is made by many 7 contributions to Making Things Public (Latour & Wieber, 2005) . In this paper, in contrast to the reliance there on exhibitionary and/or experimental forms of material culture, it is material culture's capacity to articulate the absent presence that I find most helpful. As Miller (2011) has recently reiterated, a central premise of material culture studies (MCS) is that the only way 'to apprehend the immaterial is through the material' (Miller, 2011 p 326) . Radioactive waste is, of course, absolutely about the material, but the stuff has a transcendent quality. It has that precisely because it is about futures; human generations measured in geological time. One way to imagine a DGF, then, is to configure it through the absent presence; to work with radioactivity in such a way that, although invisible and buried, it continues to be apprehended. In such a way, I argue, it is possible to arrest a future in which HAW, like so many other forms of hazardous waste before it, might be abandoned.
The paper concludes by reflecting on its contribution to the development of a politics of stuff. From 'hot' to 'cold' politics -and back again? In 2006, following three years of extensive deliberation, a major controversy over the role of expert knowledge in decision-making and a substantial programme of public engagement, the UK Commission on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) recommended deep geological disposal as the best available option for the UK's legacy of HAW, supported by underpinning R&D aimed at addressing uncertainties; a risk assessment based approach to unresolved uncertainties; and further supported by a robust process of interim storage (CoRWM, 2006 in which panels of citizens drawn from across the UK came together to discuss the problems of managing radioactive waste safely, this is the bridge to the work of CoRWM (2003 CoRWM ( -2006 . A useful summary of the trajectory appears in Bickerstaff (forthcoming), whilst a number of papers focus on
2: UK HAW, deliberative democracy and the coming apart of a politics of stuff

2.1:
CoRWM as an instance of deliberative democracy (Burgess et al. 2007; Chilvers & Burgess, 2008; Chilvers, 2008 Chilvers and Burgess (2007) discuss the range of deliberative methodologies that were trialled and applied within the CoRWM process. Although the methodologies differed they had commonalities.
They worked to position HAW first in relation to 'options for appraisal' and second through the identification of criteria by which the options identified could be made comparable and calculable (c.f. Davies, 2006; Burgess et al. 2007 ). Within CoRWM, the options numbered nine in total. 4 Once translated to criteria, deliberation condensed around safety, security, burden (for future generations), worker safety, flexibility, environment, implementability, amenity and socio-economic issues, with each option being evaluated qualitatively and quantitatively against these criteria. Seen thus, the identification of deep geological disposal as the best available option for managing HAW safely is not just underpinned by but produced through, or performed into being by, methodological Stated thus, it can be seen that the political settlement regarding what to do with UK HAW is not quite the cold politics that it might seem. Rather, there is a scalar politics here which means that hot politics is currently being enacted largely in West Cumbria and in ways which have the capacity to derail both the political settlement with HAW and the participatory model which produced it. As clear is that what is fundamentally a politics of stuff is being enacted primarily through a humancentred politics, in which potential future locations are being traded for near time and real time socio-economic benefits. In the following section I examine the unravelling of HAW as onto-politics in more detail.
2.2: The unravelling of HAW as onto-politics
That HAW is onto-politics is never clearer than at Sellafield. Here spent fuel rods from the UK's nuclear power stations lie immersed in deep tanks of blue water, cooling sufficiently such that they can be reprocessed. Vast piles of highly radioactive junk generated by vitrification lie heaped in cavernous spaces shielded by glass of immense thickness. In the HLW store radioactive waste is felt rather than seen. As one stands on the storage silos below that hold vitrified waste, one senses both the heat and the burden of responsibility that attaches to this stuff. Elsewhere there is the stuff that cannot even be seen, which is barely characterised and which threatens to overflow its means of containment -the legacy wastes that go by the name of old stores and old processing technologies:
the Magnox wastes; B32. In yet other parts of the site, compression and compaction technologies combine with cement and containers, literally to shove as much LLW as can be shoved into the remaining silos at the nearby site of Drigg. Then there are the ruins in the Sellafield landscape; the old plants that continue to defy demolition because they are too 'hot' radioactively and too difficult to handle; and the rubble -vast, unimaginable amounts of radioactive building waste generated by the phased decommissioning of the site. To visit Sellafield, then, is to be confronted by the wastes of nuclear power generation and reprocessing, by humanity's attempts to manage these, and by the capacities of some of those wastes to defy technical solutions. This is a place which testifies not just to the power of the non-human to object but to the power of the non-human to exceed and overwhelm the human. It is truly a humbling place and a place to trigger thought.
In starting this section in this way, with description garnered from three separate visits to Sellafield between 2007 and 2009, my intent is to do what was impossible for participatory/deliberative work conducted in relation to HAW; to confront the reader with the enormity and unruliness of HAW. My point is that it is only inside places such as Sellafield that the implications of HAW's energetic qualities and unruliness can seriously be appreciated. An effect of 9/11, however, is that Sellafield is one of the UK's most inaccessible places; with access restricted to industry specialists, politicians and security-cleared researchers. So immediately there is a paradox: deliberative methodologies sought to involve publics in decision-taking about managing radioactive waste safely but they were trying to Projected futures -forthcoming Environment and Planning A 13 achieve this in relation to stuff that was far from public. A key question therefore is how was HAW made public in deliberation? How was this unknown and unknowable stuff translated to publics?
As presented to lay publics, HAW takes the form of information. Often this comes as tabular classifications that state facts about the volume, weight and radioactivity of the UK's radioactive waste inventory. Tabular representations are often accompanied by images. So, for example, images of the high level waste store at Sellafield are commonly reproduced -in which little is to be seen other than a cavernous space with circles coloured yellow and black on the floor, depicting the presence or absence of high level radioactive waste stored below. Images are often accompanied by cut-away cross-sectional diagrams of the various technologies of containment currently used for UK radioactive waste. The visual, then, performs the same task as tabular representations: both present radioactive waste as ordered, disciplined, contained and tamed. Critically too, these representations are devoid of radioactivity. So, whereas when standing in the HLW store at Sellafield radioactivity enters the realms of the sense-able, in deliberative mapping radioactivity is a (large) number attached to volumes (often similarly large) of material -see note 1. It is in the realm of the cognate not the sensate. This has effects. So, whereas the first foregrounds an unfinished dialogical relation between radioactivity and the human, or the kind of relation that sits at the heart of onto-politics (Born & Barry, 2010) , the second tends to push publics to talk, with care and concern, about the long (geological) time frames of radioactive decay associated with certain radioactive wastes and to think about HAW in relation to safety, ethical burden and responsibilities of inter-generational justice.
Further on in the deliberative frame, HAW was figured through future management options and their criterion referenced comparative evaluation. Safety, security, and ethical burden emerged as central, as did the discursive articulation of an ethics of inter-generational (human) justice. Rendered calculable through the quantitative scaling of options, such concerns are human-centric. An effect is to still radioactive waste, through options, their comparison and then by the option that is considered its best available future. In deliberation, HAW plays no active part in its future other than to comply with a consensually built technology of sequestration, until such time as it becomes safe.
We see here, then, how democratising techno-science stills the stuff of HAW; smoothing it, taming it and ordering it through the processes and practices of deliberation. Onto-politics has not only unravelled but has also been reframed, largely through what Cooke and Kothari (2001) term the tyranny, or straitjacket, of participation. Combine this with the commitment to community volunteerism and its demonstration and it is possible to see not only that onto-politics has unravelled but also that it has been cast increasingly through well established practices of doing politics, which centre the benefits to be exchanged for the act of hosting HAW and which see the political exclusively in terms of the negotiation of such an agreement. However, this does not mean that the stuff itself has elided attention. Rather, as I show in the next section, the stuff has been reclaimed by science-technical discourses.
2.3: The return of techno-science
Two science-technical discourses prevail currently around UK HAW: geology and engineering design.
With respect to geology, the initial expressions of interest by the three West Cumbrian communities led procedurally to a desk-based study of Cumbrian geology, guided by a set of pre-determined exclusion criteria. The final technical report states that the purpose of this study is to rule places out, not rule them in:
"This screening is desk based, uses existing information and will not produce sites that could definitely host a facility, but will rule out areas that definitely could not host a facility for obvious geological reasons" (BGS/NERC, 2010 p. 2).
Its key output is a map, widely reproduced in West Cumbria, whose boundary has performed the mirror of the intention, suggesting to publics that siting will be confined to particular areas. Not only this, the return of West Cumbrian geology to debate about UK HAW has worked to raise the ghosts of the 1990s controversy. Thus, the site of the proposed Rock Characterisation Facility at Longlands Farm near Gosforth figures prominently in discussion (Bickerstaff, forthcoming) .At the same time, geological work is inflected through, whilst attempting to assert its difference from, the scientific disputes first rehearsed in the NIREX period (Oldroyd, 2002; West Cumbria MRWS, 2010 -3.4 
.2).
This is made all the more challenging as some of the scientific figures involved in the 1995-6 Public
Inquiry have returned to debate, to recite a key finding of that Inquiry: that West Cumbrian geology fails to meet internationally agreed criteria for HAW's safe disposal. Furthermore, the case for the politicisation of current geological work has already been made, with Smyth (2011) stating that public domain evidence and academic research assembled by the Public Inquiry has been 'airbrushed out'. He goes on to argue:
"[the BGS's] remit was tightly constrained, to give the misleading impression that some parts of West Cumbria are to be considered suitable for nuclear waste disposal -after further site investigations, of course. At no point will the BGS be permitted to conclude that no part of West Cumbria is suitable" (Smyth, 2011) .
What the Public Inquiry had rendered a 'cold' controversy, then, has suddenly become a 'hot' scientific controversy again. Further, tying the processes of technical evaluation to a parallel process of staged community volunteerism raises fundamental questions for geological science, namely: what happens to scientific knowledge when the boundary conditions for site evaluation are determined politically, through volunteerism; will scientific knowledge refuse those boundary conditions, and -if so -how; and how will geological science navigate a situation in which established knowledge suggests certain locations in the UK to be more suitable technically than others but where there might be political pressure to produce a 'good enough' resolution?
Inevitably, those questions remain as yet unanswered.
At the same time as desk-based geological feasibility studies are being conducted, engineering design has begun the work of conceptualising a future DGF. Although decades off construction, and dependent in its details on the geological site eventually decided upon, the concept of a future DGF animal and plant life are also seen as having the capacity to purify HAW. This is significant. Not only does it signal a degree of ambivalence as to which cultural categories have the capacity to mask radioactive waste (nature or agricultural life) but it flags also that demonstration is being performed through these representations of a DGF. The logic here appears to go something like this:
technocratic conceptualisation imagines a future DGF as safe sequestration; but safe sequestration is recognised to require demonstration that is more than technical, if it is to convince publics; to cite domesticated life is to perform that demonstration. Publics here are supposed to be quiescent witnesses (Reno, 2011) ; convinced by the concept demonstrations, confident in technology's capacities to order and corral HAW into distant futures, and trusting of the nuclear waste management industry's technological capacities and decision-taking (c.f. Zonabend, 1989 ).
When we look at what is going on with HAW, then, whilst West Cumbrian publics deliberate, we find a reversion to a familiar story -HAW's positioning as the preserve of expert scientific and technocratic discourses. If there is one lesson from the long, contentious debate over UK HAW it is that such developments need to be watched closely. Not only does this situation mark the unravelling of HAW as onto-politics and its reclamation by techno-science, but it shows too the return of old scientific controversies and their previous resolution. The details of the case indicate that the turn to deliberation has not erased these controversies but rather has created a gap in which techno-science returns to be haunted by its past.
In the next section I begin to contest this state of affairs. The initial manoeuvre is to join with the undone science tradition of work in STS to highlight the knowledge gaps in the NDA's public displays and to anticipate a future DGF as abandoned.
3: A DGF as undone science: anticipating abandonment
In an early paper on public experiments, Harry Collins (1988) makes the distinction between experiments and other forms of scientific display. One example used to develop that argument is of the then British Nuclear Fuels Limited's (BNFL's) 1984 televised scientific test, comprising a collision between a diesel train and a nuclear flask wagon. Designed to demonstrate the safety of rail transportation of spent fuel from the UK's nuclear power stations to Sellafield, the experiment asked publics to draw a general principle (safety) from a single test. Nearly 30 years on from that experiment, the NDA uses public displays to assert the general principle that a DGF is a safe means to the disposal of HAW. These displays position publics not as witnesses to the event of a scientific test but as audiences, to be educated and convinced by the idealised representations and concept models of nuclear techno-science. These representations obscure a parallel process of scientific experimentation. Currently, major programmes of experimental work on HAW are being conducted across a range of UK universities and by the NDA. These research programmes focus on radioactive waste characterisation, candidate matrices and their integrity, waste loadings, the simulation and experimentation of radioactivity's effects on candidate matrices, and various technologies of encapsulation and packaging (Lee et al. 2006 ). As such, there is much that is unknown about the sequestration of UK HAW.
Identifying the knowledge gaps masked by the NDA's public displays of a DGF signals a connection with the undone science tradition of work in STS (Gross, 2007; Hess, 2009 ). Frickel et al. (2010 argue that the identification of knowledge gaps is a key point of intervention for work in the undone science tradition, and that this is one of the means by which issues of knowledge-power can be brought into STS, to show how certain science is done or not done. Much of this work is linked to the environmental justice/science activism tradition (Frickel, 2004a (Frickel, , 2004b and is exemplified by
Frickel's work on New Orleans post Hurricane Katrina (Frickel, 2008; Frickel & Bess Vincent, 2007) . Latour (2008) highlights the perils of abandonment, linking this to the Frankenstein myth.
Nonetheless, the political question raised by the prospect of a DGF's abandonment is 'How to intervene to attempt to arrest such an anticipated future'? For the undone science tradition, intervention is achieved by positioning the undone, or knowledge gaps, as a task for civil society science. A key question though is how amenable is HAW to such traditions of work? Critical here is that whilst activist-based science has been highly effective in monitoring the leakage of radioactivity beyond Sellafield, it cannot gain access to the radioactive wastes contained within. This is because HAW is political waste; shrouded in secrecy and bounded by state-within-state security discourses materialised as border crossings, check points, surveillance technologies, razor wire, submachine guns and people profiling. To develop the arguments of Gabrielle Hecht (2006) , UK HAW is constituted in such a way that it not only counts as nuclear but such is its degree of what she terms 'nuclearity' that it is territorially concentrated and bounded. It is not just sequestered within the confines of the UK nation state but primarily in one place: Sellafield. That makes it a difficult object for civil society science to know. So, whilst such work might address the more open science of West Cumbrian geology, or of groundwater flows, its capacities to know the stuff that will be placed in a DGF can only ever be limited, making it as vulnerable to the charge of knowledge gaps and undone science as the work it mobilises to contest.
In the final section of the paper I take up the challenge of how to contest an anticipated future of a DGF's abandonment, turning not to civil society science but to onto-politics and to a tradition of work that joins with Latour (2008) to recognise that to address abandonment requires working with attachments.
4: Countering Frankenstein-ian futures: materialising a DGF as attachments
My starting point in this section is to think HAW through Jane Bennett's vital materialist project, specifically her turn to Rancière to think through Bruno Latour's concept of a parliament of things (Bennett, 2010) . Bennett draws attention to unruliness, or the power to disrupt, as an explicitly nonhuman capacity in the demos. For her, the key political intervention is to change what is seen, or to overthrow the regime of the perceptible (2010, p 106), to admit the objections of non-humans.
Radioactive waste's capacity to object is well-known, both within the nuclear reprocessing industry (Bolter, 1996) and through the work of anti-nuclear campaign groups and NGOs who have long documented leakages of radioactive material. But the difficulties of making radioactivity perceptible are considerable. This is not just a matter of radioactivity's invisibility and the consequent need for inscription devices. It is also a question of radioactivity as thing power. Radioactivity's vitality in relation to the human is widely appreciated. Less so is that such is its vitality that it ruptures the integrity of all that comes into contact with it -be that organic or inorganic life. More than this, radioactivity is a colonising materiality. So, to monitor HAW through a combination of robotic and inscription technologies makes radioactive waste of these devices, whilst to sequester HAW as waste forms constitutes more radioactive waste of the very technologies that are enrolled to stabilise HAW -that is, of industrial scale plants and process technologies. Radioactivity, then, is a particularly energetic thing power. Recognising this is important to thinking about HAW in a future DGF. What this does is to contest techno-centric accounts which highlight the capacities of engineered and geological barriers to contain HAW safely into an indefinite future. Rather than assuming the capacity to control, vital materialism foregrounds a more humble perspective; one which admits HAW's potential to disrupt, colonise and destroy all forms of organic and inorganic life, and which starts from the premise that HAW can and will overflow.
Establishing HAW as an energetic, colonising and annihilating thing power means that HAW can never be granted equivalence with humanity or animal and plant life. Current NDA public displays and simulations of a DGF do not admit a sense of thing power. Rather, as befits the discourses through which they are thought, they are about the technical mastery of HAW. Within experimental work, however, the energetic capacities of HAW, specifically its distributed potential effects within a DGF, are well to the fore, albeit framed within technical discourses of control. They are illustrated by concerns over: gas build up as a by-product of radioactivity's sequestration at depth; the inevitable deterioration and decay of technologies of containment, and their leakage; the capacities of technologies to resist groundwater encroachment;
and the dangers of co-location of ILW and HLW (NWAA, 2010) . Taking these concerns as a starting point makes for thinking a DGF not as an operational emplacement facility for safely disposing of HAW but as continually (un) an assemblage that -for reasons of responsibility -has to hold together and endure, even as its vagabond qualities are admitted. To achieve this, a DGF has to continue to be apprehended. To realise that effect requires that a DGF's meaning be stabilised. In the remainder of this section, therefore, I turn to material culture studies (MCS) to offer some thoughts as to how this might be achieved.
To cast a DGF through material culture means dispensing with thinking a DGF through technical notions of disposal; to think of a DGF as a means to HAW's burial. A basic premise of MCS is that the material culture associated with (human) burial (typically memorials, tombs, crosses) is both a means of memorialising to forget and a way of invoking the absent presence. The range of literature dedicated to the material culture of (human) death demonstrates this. Grave stones, burial sites and the more transient material culture that is placed on those sites and renewed at key dates (flowers, cards, soft toys) all work to figure the absent presence, its connection to human loss, and the capacity of material culture to attend to the immaterial through gathering people to the material, and by doing things with the material (Hallam & Hockey, 2001; Kelleher et al. 2005; Clayden & Dixon, 2007; Maddrell & Sidaway, 2010 Hole -an immense black basalt stone, again facing the sun that would get intolerably hot.
All these concepts materialise and communicate a DGF as an absent presence through working with megaliths. They also attempt to arrest potential disturbance. Yet, it is striking that they work not just by holding publics and HAW apart but also by fabricating relations of separation or even expulsion.
Keep away; danger and the risk to human life are central messages in this artwork, as is the beyondhuman scale of radioactivity. Less clear, therefore, is how such materialisations would work to assemble publics, or to forge attachments. Latour (2008) 
5: Conclusions
At the heart of this paper is UK HAW, its projected future in a DGF, and an attempt to intervene in shaping that future, to arrest an anticipated abandonment through an alliance of onto-politics and material culture. Radioactive waste is one of the most established of techno-science controversies in the UK as well as one which, beyond the boundaries of West Cumbria at least, has been turned politically 'cold', through a combination of deliberation and policy formation. That makes it an entirely appropriate vehicle for making a concluding set of observations on the wider field of a politics of stuff.
Through the intricacies of the case, the paper demonstrates the difficulties that confront furthering onto-politics. It is one thing, then, to cite a parliament of things in words -in the Austin-ian sense of citational performativity. That is the manoeuvre performed by much work in the field, precisely because the key interlocutor for such work is political theory and philosophy. But is this enough? Can words alone admit things to the demos? Whilst some might continue to answer a 'yes' to that question, an emergent consensus would seem to say 'no'. Indeed, as Callon, Latour and their coworkers have shown, to admit things to the demos requires an active engagement with things, creativity, publics; a turn to public experimentation -or, to doing things with things not just doing things with words. Much by way of recent work on public experimentation addresses domestic, or consumer-facing, technologies (Braun & Whatmore, 2010) . To attempt to keep the demos open to the unfinished qualities of radioactive waste however, is a different order task. To accomplish that requires advocates of onto-politics to engage in politics as practice. The ebb and flow of 'hot' and 'cold' politics is critical here. As the details of the case show, in the course of political settlement, or the transition from 'hot' to 'cold' politics, HAW has become still life. It has been tamed. So, in the course of doing politics with HAW what counts as the political slides all too easily away from onto-politics to human-centred politics and ways of acting politically; leaving the stuff to be reclaimed by the very techno-centric discourses that first produced the controversy. That is a serious problemand it may well be a problem that goes beyond the case of radioactive waste. So, how to respond?
On the basis of the paper, I make five suggestions. First, and unambiguously, to affect a politics of stuff requires an engagement with political settlements of techno-scientific controversies. These science has already produced, rather than to address immanent things, as techno-scientific concepts and as provisionally assembled. So, that means, fourthly, that the immanent conceptual within techno-science emerges as a site for political intervention. Fifthly, the question this raises is: 'How to intervene in shaping that conceptual, in ways that are attentive to thing power?' There are various possibilities here but the one I find most productive, at least with respect to radioactive waste, is an alliance of onto-politics with MCS. It is relatively commonplace, particularly in geographical writing, to posit MCS as deficient to, or as in some sense running counter to, the more-than-human, and particularly to vital materialism. Such representations rest on a caricature, misunderstanding even, of MCS. A more nuanced reading shows that material culture is absolutely about the on-going, unfinished relation of the material and the immaterial -albeit with a human subject. It is for exactly 27 those reasons that material culture has been critical in manoeuvres that seek to admit things to the demos (Latour & Wieber, 2005) . Keeping them there is likely to be no different.
